

Chapter 4

Peace Operations

Properly constituted, peace operations can be a useful tool to advance American national interests and pursue our national security objectives.

PDD 25

With the Cold War's end, the threat of global war has become distant. New opportunities have emerged to promote peace, prosperity, and enhanced cooperation among nations. The Cold War's end has also brought increasing regional instability. Although the causes are much debated, many world situations continue to be complex, dynamic, and dangerous. Uncertainty exists in how the security environment will evolve. Challenges to global and regional stability fall into the following categories: cross-border aggression, internal conflict, transnational threats, development and proliferation of dangerous military technologies, and humanitarian disasters. These challenges have compelled the international community to increasingly call on military forces to prevent or end conflicts. Operations such as those occurring in Somalia (1992-1993) and Bosnia (1992-1995) made obvious the need for clear guidance in United States

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(US) participation for peace operations (PO). In response, the president issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25. Joint doctrine for PO is in JP 3-07.3.

As in all operations, the military remains subordinate to civilian authority. Whether the mission is to conduct peacekeeping operations (PKO), conduct peace enforcement operations (PEO), or support diplomatic efforts, PO are a continuation of the political process. Synchronizing all instruments of national power leads to successful PO. This is best done through strong interagency leadership and an integrated political-military (Pol-Mil) plan. In May 1997, the president signed PDD 56. This policy requires US government agencies to institutionalize the lessons learned from recent experiences and outlines a process that establishes procedures for an interagency body to produce an integrated plan to provide strategic clarity.

FORMS OF PEACE OPERATIONS

4-1. PO are multiagency operations involving diplomatic and humanitarian agencies with military support. They may be conducted to prevent or control a conflict, in support of a peace settlement, or in response to a complex emergency.

4-2. Peace operations will be conducted on the basis of appropriate legal authority, the precise nature of which will often depend on the circumstances. For example, the United Nations (UN) Security Council or some other competent body

The broad term *peace operations* encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.

JP 3-07

may issue a formal mandate for the operation. The mandate establishes both the political and military objectives as well as its scope of authority. In some cases, guidance is detailed; in others it may be vague. The end state is a peaceful settlement among all parties. The military commander through the military decision making process determines appropriate military objectives and end states.

4-3. The Army will participate in PO, either as part of a UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), multinational force, or unilaterally. However, unilateral employment is the least prevalent option. The US usually prefers the enhanced legitimacy of a multinational force. Additionally, Army forces will operate with international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other agencies participating in the peace process. The success of the overall peace operation depends in part on the degree of cooperation among these various actors. In PO, there is neither an enemy nor a military victory. The forms of PO are peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement operations, and operations in support of diplomatic efforts. (NATO refers to PKO and PEO as “peace support operations.”)

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

4-4. *Peacekeeping* consists of military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement (JP 3-07). Before PKO begin, a credible truce or cease-fire is in effect, and the parties to the dispute must consent to the operation. Peacekeeping takes place following diplomatic negotiation and agreement among the parties to a dispute, the sponsoring organization, and the potential troop-contributing nations.

4-5. The UN Charter makes no specific mention of PKO. These operations have evolved as a pragmatic response to various conflicts with which the UN has dealt. Peacekeeping seeks to settle disputes through the medium of peaceful third-party initiatives. It has often proven valuable in peace accords and agreements following interstate conflict. PKO have usually been conducted in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter.

4-6. The peacekeeping force must use all techniques available, short of coercive force, to gain and maintain the initiative. Using force in a peacekeeping mission is generally limited to self-defense. The force maintains and promotes consent so the political process can continue to guide the parties to a lasting settlement. A loss of consent by the parties usually necessitates the withdrawal of the peacekeeping force or a change in its mission to one of peace enforcement.

OBSERVATION MISSIONS

4-7. United Nations observation missions are performed primarily by unarmed military observers (MILOBs) but may also be performed by peacekeeping (PK) forces. In either case, observer forces help ensure that the parties to the dispute follow the agreements. UN observer groups may also use civilian personnel or police as observers. Regional organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, also conduct observation missions. The multinational force and observers and Military Observation Mission Ecuador-Peru are examples of ad hoc observation missions. The success of these missions depends on the willingness of the disputing parties to cooperate with the terms of the accord or agreement. This willingness may exist because MILOBs have established a visible presence and are able to detect agreement violations. They have four tasks:

- ***Observing, monitoring, verifying, and reporting any alleged violation of the governing agreements.*** Agreements may include treaties, truces, cease-fires, arms control agreements, or any other binding agreements between the disputing parties. The primary means for observing and monitoring include observation posts (OPs), mounted and dismounted patrols, and aerial reconnaissance. OPs should provide prolonged and unobstructed observation of people or areas as specified by the mission. OPs can be temporary, occupied periodically for a matter of hours or days, or more permanent. Permanent OPs may require extensive engineer support for force protection, sustainment, and use as a support base from which to mount patrols. Patrols are used to confirm or supervise a cease-fire by establishing a presence to

grant legitimacy to both the PK force and the cease-fire accords or agreement. Patrols also provide surveillance within a buffer zone (BZ) to report violations of the agreement. Violations may include incidents such as offensive combat operations, unauthorized troop movements, reinforced defensive positions, or even provocative radio broadcasts. Aerial reconnaissance conducted by rotary-winged aircraft permits the commander to quickly survey a large area. On-board cameras can provide near-real time feedback to the commander. Terms of reference (TOR) may restrict the types of weapon systems available to the PK force. Maintaining up-to-date information on the disposition of disputing forces in the operational area is critical to PKO. This will require periodic visits to forward positions to observe and report on the disposition of forces of the disputing parties.

- ***Investigating alleged cease-fire violations, boundary incidents, and complaints.*** The observer force investigates alleged infractions to gain evidence regarding agreement violations. It may become involved in negotiation or mediation, to include direct dialogue, between the disputing parties. The two parties should conduct negotiation or mediation on neutral territory. The unit commander, if at all possible, remains separate from the process to serve as the “honest broker” and to maintain a sense of impartiality. The commander is provided or selects a mediator whom all parties perceive as fair and impartial. Some NGOs, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), can provide mediation services. Reconciling differences at the lowest possible level often contributes to the overall success of PKO.
- ***Conducting regular liaison visits within the operational area.*** Disputes thrive on rumors, uncertainty, and prejudice. Therefore, liaison visits maintain personal contact. They permit a timely and routine exchange of information with disputing parties, the host nation, local civilian officials, international agencies, PK force headquarters, and other national contingents.
- ***Verifying the storage or destruction of certain categories of military equipment specified in the relevant agreements.*** If the terms of the relevant agreement require belligerents to establish weapon storage sites for certain categories of weapons, the PK forces must periodically inspect these sites to ensure compliance. The inspection team will inventory supplies, weapons, and equipment at each site and report discrepancies. PK forces must plan for uncooperative local officials, demonstrations, and other forms of civil disturbance. As observer and inspection teams are unarmed, the team will withdraw if unable to negotiate entrance to the site.

SUPERVISION AND ASSISTANCE

4-8. Lightly armed forces normally perform supervision and assistance missions. The force undertaking these tasks requires large service support organizations, equipment, and finances. In addition to those tasks being performed by MILOBs in observation missions, PK forces may perform other tasks when they are within the scope of the military mission, support the desired end state, and are authorized by appropriate authority. These tasks include—

- ***Supervising cease-fires.*** Once a cease-fire is arranged, forces may observe and report on the disputing parties' compliance with a cease-fire. The force may have to deploy on the territory of more than one nation to perform its mission. The tempo and outcome of diplomatic activities taken to establish a credible cease-fire are often unpredictable, and negotiations to constitute and insert a force may occur simultaneously. Therefore, the PK force may need to deploy rapidly. As heavy weapons—such as tanks, fighting vehicles, and artillery—may be inappropriate or prohibited, units may require additional vehicles and helicopters to provide tactical mobility.
- ***Supervising disengagements and withdrawals.*** As diplomatic activity continues, agreement to establish a BZ may require PK forces to supervise the disengagement and withdrawal of hostile forces. The PK force positions itself between the disputing parties to prevent a breakdown of the cease-fire and help ensure an uneventful disengagement and withdrawal. Timely deployment and implementation of well-conceived and detailed plans that are understood by all parties greatly reduces the inherent risks associated with interpositioning. The PK force personnel may mediate disagreements in the positioning of the disputed parties' forces, verify troop and equipment dispositions, and, if authorized, provide assistance to the civilian population in the BZ.
- ***Supervising prisoner of war exchanges.*** At any stage in resolving a dispute, PK forces may be asked to supervise and assist in prisoner of war exchanges between the parties. TOR, status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs), rules of engagement (ROE), or the mandate of the force may provide guidance on missions that PK forces are authorized to conduct. PK units will be required to monitor the exchange site and may be asked to provide logistic support, such as transportation for prisoners of war and medical treatment and evacuation. The designated mediator, such as the ICRC or UN, will execute the actual exchange.
- ***Assisting civil authorities.*** PK forces may assist civil authorities in functions such as observing procedures at polling sites, transferring authority, partitioning territory, evacuating, escorting convoys, or temporarily administering civil functions. The civil-military operations (CMO) staff officer, coordinating with the civil-military operations center (CMOC), provides advice and assistance to execute these functions.
- ***Providing military support to elections.*** PK forces may be asked to support elections. Military forces may be required to assist civil authorities in providing a secure environment so elections can proceed. Such assistance may be as simple as providing administrative support and security of polling stations to creating an environment conducive for displaced persons to return to their rightful voting place. The military's primary responsibility is to prevent a disrupted election process. The integrity of the elections themselves is the responsibility of the election commissions. Many tasks—such as freedom of movement, security patrols, OPs, and medical support—are ancillary to ongoing PKO. Commanders must incorporate the appropriate agencies—International Police Training Force, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, mayors, local police, former warring factions—emphasizing each agency's responsibilities for maintaining law and order during the

election. Commanders can offer the use of psychological operations (PSYOP) assets (audio, visual, and audiovisual) to more effectively disseminate information regarding the elections (such as registration procedures, polling places, security measures, and election results).

- ***Assisting in the maintenance of public order.*** PK forces may assist in reestablishing or maintaining public order. The responsibility for public order rests with the civil police. However, military assistance may be required if a breakdown has occurred in the civil police structure or if situations are beyond the civil police capacity to control.
- ***Assisting in foreign humanitarian assistance operations.*** Although foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) is not a peace operation, it may be necessary for PK forces to provide security and logistic support for relief operations within a complex contingency. It may also be necessary for PK forces to provide transportation and security for NGOs and other agencies. Civil affairs (CA) personnel provide to the commander a resource for the planning and conduct of FHA. See Chapter 6 for discussion of FHA.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

4-9. *Peace enforcement* (PE) is the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order (JP 3-07). PE operations are by definition coercive in nature and rely on the threat or use of force. However, the impartiality with which the peace force treats all parties and the nature of its objectives separates PE from war. Should it be necessary to conduct operations in support of one particular party against another, then the PE would deteriorate into war. If this situation develops, then the authorizing authority must reassess the operation. The purpose of peace enforcement is not to destroy or defeat an enemy, but to use force or threat of force to *establish a safe and secure environment* so that peace building can succeed.

4-10. The term peace enforcement is not specifically mentioned in the UN Charter; however, the charter's language allows the Security Council to authorize military operations. Specifically, Chapter VII empowers the council to take such actions "as may be necessary to restore or maintain international peace and security" (Article 42 of the UN Charter). It is accepted that the UN is not now in a position to adequately conduct peace enforcement operations on its own, but rather only peacekeeping operations. Peace enforcement operations are often conducted by regional organizations or a coalition of states.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT OVERVIEW

4-11. Since PE may include offensive and defensive operations, missions must be clear and end states defined. Transition to combat action requires successfully applying warfighting skills. In a theater of operations, offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations will occur simultaneously. Forces conducting PE may be involved in forcibly separating belligerent parties in one location and assisting with refugees just a few kilometers away.

4-12. The forces employed for such operations will be armed and equipped based on commanders' visualizations and the factors of METT-TC—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations. Combat arms units, with combat support and combat service support units are most often employed in this role. Special operations forces, especially CA and PSYOP assets, directly assist in developing consensus and sustaining legitimacy that contributes to peace and security.

4-13. PE operations are normally conducted in several phases. The first phase involves inserting rapidly deployable combat forces to establish a significant and visible military presence. Subsequent phases involve stabilizing the area and transitioning from a military presence to support for the development of a competent civil authority. Any number of subordinate operations may be conducted simultaneously or sequentially.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT SUBORDINATE OPERATIONS

Forcible Separation of Belligerents

4-14. This operation poses the highest risk of any PEO. Forcible separation may involve reducing the combat capability of one or more of the belligerent parties by disarming and demobilizing them. The PE force normally retains the right of first use of force. Forces conducting forcible separation require extensive offensive combat capability, as well as combat

support and combat service support. The goal is to force the belligerent parties to disengage, withdraw, and subsequently establish a BZ or demilitarized zone (DMZ). Security operations—such as screening, combat and reconnaissance patrolling, performing cordon and search, and establishing checkpoints and roadblocks to control movement into and within the BZ or DMZ—may be conducted to maintain the separation of belligerent parties.

4-15. **Separate Belligerents.** PE force commanders must negotiate with commanders of both sides, at the tactical level, to achieve and verify agreement on withdrawal procedures. Belligerents should be required to withdraw to positions that allow no observation and direct fires into the area. The commander must understand the strength of the belligerent forces both in the proposed area of separation (AOS) and those forces outside the area with the capability to reinforce. The PE force must be prepared to conduct combat operations, to seize key terrain and otherwise force the withdrawal of reluctant belligerents, and to secure the AOS. The PE force should pre-position itself *quickly* to fill the void created by the retreating belligerents. If possible, the PE force should place liaison officers, with appropriate transportation and communications, with the headquarters of the opposing sides. Once the area of separation is established, PE forces secure the area with a highly visible presence by patrols, checkpoints, and OPs. PE forces must be

PE Subordinate Operations

- Forcible separation of belligerents
- Establishment and supervision of protected areas
- Sanction and exclusion zone enforcement
- Movement denial and guarantee
- Restoration and maintenance of order
- Protection of humanitarian assistance

FM 3-0

prepared to conduct defensive combat operations to repel attack and offensive combat operations to restore the area of separation. The AOS is three-dimensional and may require air defense weapons and detection systems to control no-fly zones.

4-16. Disarm Belligerents. The mandate may require the PE force to disarm or demobilize the belligerent parties. These tasks are complex, difficult, and often dangerous. The PE force demonstrates a clear resolve and intent to disarm or demobilize designated belligerent parties according to the agreement. If these actions are taken prematurely without adequately preparing and involving the parties, the situation may destabilize, leading to a reemergence of violence. If the PE force has responsibility to store, secure, and account for collected weapons, it must establish a storage area large enough for inspecting, storing, and if directed, destroying weapons and materiel. Space must be allocated to support a security force and support administrative requirements, such as accounting for materiel stored, collected, transferred, or destroyed. The PE force must maintain logs accounting for personnel or units surrendering materiel. Security and accountability is critical.

4-17. Disarming may include seizing ammunition, collecting and destroying weapons and supplies, closing weapons and ammunition factories, and preventing resupply. Humanitarian demining operations (HDO) are a part of the disarmament program. Because of the threat to peace and safety posed by landmines, HDO have become a significant PO activity. Many countries already have pre-existing mine clearance activities conducted by the UN or NGOs. In many demining missions, military ordnance specialists from the US or other countries partner with civilian organizations such as the United Nations Mine Action Service. Demining is ultimately a host-nation responsibility. Army participation in HDO focuses on mine awareness education and, most importantly, training of host-nation personnel in the surveying, marking, and clearing of mines. Army personnel do not remove mines; however, they assist and train others in demining techniques and procedures. Specialists, such as explosive ordnance disposal personnel, may be called on to destroy unexploded explosive ordnance, such as munitions shells, fuses, grenades, and rockets. Special forces, CA, and PSYOP personnel are currently the primary means to execute the geographic combatant commanders' HDO programs. Explosive ordnance disposal and engineer personnel are also included in these programs and integrated into operational training missions.

4-18. Demobilization. Demobilization is the process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military establishment and defense-based civilian economy into a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. Following demobilization, Army forces may support integrating military and paramilitary forces into society by providing training, advice, and assistance for the new defense or security force, and through information operations. Army forces have a role in demobilization that may include—

- Providing intelligence support and overall security during the demobilization process.
- Providing incentives and disincentives for the forming, arming, and training of the new defense force.
- Supporting with information operations.

- Supporting these actions through the joint commissions.
- Providing liaison coordination teams to local commanders as a confidence-building measure during the disarmament and demobilization.

Establishment and Supervision of Protected Areas

4-19. The requirement to establish and supervise a protected or safe area can arise when any community is at risk from persistent attack. Unless those in the safe area are disarmed, it may be used as a base from which to conduct raids and attacks. Commanders must be clear on what is expected of the force tasked to establish and maintain a protected or safe area. Inevitably, commanders will need to counter accusations from those within and beyond the protected area that the operation is designed to assist the other side. The nature of the threat will determine the force profile required to secure the protected area.

4-20. Protected areas may contain residents, refugees, displaced persons, and substantial numbers of forces of one or more of the belligerent forces. Army forces may be charged to establish and supervise such areas, as well as to provide support and assistance to other organizations in the protected area. The first requirement to making the area safe is to demilitarize the area. Once accomplished, additional tasks may include—

- Establishing, monitoring, and enforcing weapon exclusion zones.
- Establishing and maintaining cantonment areas and weapon-holding areas and sites.
- Conducting patrols and searches.
- Manning checkpoints and other control measures.
- Planning for reinforcement and extraction.

Sanction and Exclusion Zone Enforcement

4-21. Enforcement of sanctions includes a broad range of possible missions. Commanders must understand that actions to enforce sanctions, while endorsed by the UN Security Council, have traditionally been considered acts of war and should posture their forces accordingly.

4-22. Restricting the flow of goods across international borders is accomplished by using OPs, dismounted and vehicular patrols, and aerial surveillance integrated with checkpoints. Unauthorized or contraband supplies and equipment are confiscated or destroyed. Units must be prepared to stop individuals involved in illegal activity and turn them over to the civil authority.

Movement Denial and Guarantee

4-23. While similar to the PK mission of observing forces, in PE forces may be authorized to use force to prevent unauthorized movement of military forces versus merely to observe and report such activity. PE forces must have sufficient firepower to compel the belligerent forces to honor the agreement.

4-24. PE forces guarantee transit rights of noncombatants, NGOs, or other designated groups through their controlling presence and deterrence. PE

forces may have to physically occupy certain terrain and structures, such as road intersections and bridges, to protect unobstructed freedom of movement. PE forces must have sufficient strength to deal with a wide range of challenges, from civil disturbances to attacks by belligerent forces.

Restoration and Maintenance of Order

4-25. Operations to restore order are conducted to halt violence and to support, reinstate, or establish civil authorities. In a failed state situation, international law may require the commander to establish law and order in his geographic area of operations and to provide a minimum standard of humane care and treatment for all civilians. These operations are designed to restore stability to the point where indigenous police forces can effectively enforce the law and reinstate civil authority. PE forces may be required to conduct combat operations, confiscate weapons, and suppress or detain threatening elements. They may provide security and assist in training a new police force before transferring the responsibility for long-term security to the UN.

4-26. When assisting in establishing law and order, PE forces may support local or international police forces or—in the absence of any civil authority—execute alone. PE forces may be given the authority to detain persons suspected of criminal or unlawful actions. Detainees may possess weapons or other forms of contraband. TOR, SOFA, and ROE define those activities that PE forces are obligated to prevent. Interpreters and military police officers should be used when possible. Detainees should be quickly processed on-site and evacuated to a holding area. Procedures for search, interrogation, segregation, and security are strictly enforced. PE forces are responsible for the humane treatment and facilities accorded the detainees.

4-27. PE forces may be required to search a particular site or a general area (rural and urban) to apprehend personnel, confiscate contraband, interdict smuggling operations, or to sustain a secure environment. Operations may be as simple as using checkpoints to search personnel and vehicles or as complex as a cordon and search operation. PE forces may have to temporarily restrict civilian freedom of movement, using curfews or restricted routes and areas. Searches, apprehensions, and seizures must be legal and in strict compliance with the mandate or agreement.

Protection of Humanitarian Assistance

4-28. PE forces may be tasked to provide protection for humanitarian assistance. This mission might include protection for NGOs, US government agencies, and other military personnel who provide humanitarian assistance. Such protection may include securing base areas, such as air and sea ports, protecting routes or corridors for transporting relief supplies, escorting convoys, and providing security for distribution sites. If belligerent parties oppose the delivery of relief supplies by NGOs or other agencies, then PE forces may deliver the supplies by providing airlift or other forms of logistic support to FHA operations.

OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS

4-29. Military support of diplomatic efforts improves the chances for success in the peace process by lending credibility to diplomatic actions and demonstrating resolve to achieve viable political settlements. In addition to or as an integral part of PO, Army forces may conduct operations in support of diplomatic efforts to establish order before, during, and after conflict. While these activities are primarily the responsibility of civilian agencies, the military can support these efforts within its capabilities. Army forces may support diplomatic initiatives such as preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace building.

SUPPORT TO PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

4-30. *Preventive diplomacy* consists of diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence (JP 3-07). Army support to preventive diplomacy may include shows of force (see Chapter 5) such as preventive deployments or increasing levels of readiness. A *preventive deployment* is the deployment of military forces to deter violence at the interface or zone of potential conflict where tension is rising among parties. Forces may be employed in such a way that they are indistinguishable from a peacekeeping force in terms of equipment, force posture, and activities (JP 1-02). The objective is to demonstrate commitment to a peaceful resolution while underlining willingness to use a ready and capable military force if necessary. When confronted with the military resolve of the international community, the competing factions or governments will reluctantly engage in violent conflict. Should deterrence fail, the preventive deployment force must be robust enough to defend itself while a decision is made either to withdraw or reinforce.

SUPPORT TO PEACEMAKING

4-31. *Peacemaking* is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves the issues that led to it (JP 3-07). Diplomatic efforts are essential to create the conditions for a signed agreement. Military leaders should be involved in negotiating the military aspects of a peace agreement. This often includes face-to-face meetings with the military leaders of the warring factions. Army support to peacemaking includes military-to-military relations, security assistance (see Chapter 5), peacetime deployments, or other activities that influence the disputing parties to seek a diplomatic settlement.

SUPPORT TO PEACE BUILDING

4-32. *Peace building* consists of post-conflict actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict (JP 3-07). It provides the reconstruction and social rehabilitation that offers hope to resolve the conflict and sustain the peace. Military forces have a limited yet essential role in supporting peace building. Peace building begins while PEO or PKO are underway and may continue for years.

4-33. Army support to peace building can include the same activities as longer-term foreign internal defense operations (see Chapter 3). Support to

peace building may also include military support to relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction or development, negotiation and mediation, management of arms, or assisting in human rights investigations by other agencies. In some cases, Army forces may directly provide support to a recovering host nation or population. Specific types of support may include, but are not limited to, demobilization of belligerent parties, training for demining, temporary support to or repatriation for refugees, return of displaced persons to their original homes, electoral assistance, maintaining public order and security, and maintaining a deterrent presence. JP 3-57 and FM 3-57 provide details on CMO activities that Army forces may conduct in support of peace building.

CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT

4-34. *Complex contingency operations* are large-scale peace operations (or elements thereof) conducted by a combination of military forces and nonmilitary organizations that combine one or more of the elements of peace operations which include one or more elements of other types of operations such as foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, support to insurgency, or support to counterinsurgency (JP 3-57). These operations do not spring up overnight. In the case of a humanitarian crisis, various organizations, including governmental and nongovernmental organizations, will identify the early symptoms and attempt resolution, usually before the situation attracts the attention of the international media. A wider international response may be demanded should the situation degenerate and an armed conflict causes destabilization, starvation, or human rights violations beyond the immediate capacity of diplomatic teams, UN agencies, and NGOs to resolve. These organizations provide the international community with the first evaluation of the crisis.

4-35. As the situation degenerates, the media will focus on the issue. National and international news media coverage plays a major role in quickly framing public debate and shaping public opinion. The news media serves as a forum for the analysis and critique of goals, objectives, and actions. It can influence political, strategic, and operational planning, decisions, and mission success and failure. It will be a major factor in shaping the international community's response.

4-36. Numerous actions on the diplomatic front will be mounted. The military may support diplomatic efforts by conducting demonstrations, exercises, or preventive deployments. If consensus can be reached between states or among the parties to a dispute and a peace agreement is signed, then the UN Security Council may authorize a peacekeeping operation in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter. If consensus is not reached or if the consensus of all the participants is not clear even with a signed document, then the UN Security Council may authorize a PE mission in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

4-37. The military objective in all these operations is to create the conditions for other political, economic, and humanitarian peace building activities to achieve the political objective stated in the mandate and to transition from involvement. Building consensus among the parties to the conflict is critical and allows the force to lower its operational profile to one more akin to PKO.

As the situation allows, PK techniques should be gradually introduced and the operation should come increasingly to resemble a PK mission.

4-38. The situation is considerably different and more challenging if a PK operation must be reconfigured as a PE operation. If consent is lost, a PK force is not capable of dealing with the situation (see Figure 4-1). New political decisions, mandates, ROE, or force compositions will be necessary. Optimally, Army forces should not transition from one peace operation role to another unless a mandate or a political decision changes and appropriate adjustments to force structure, ROE, and other aspects of the mission are made. The PK force may have to be replaced rather than augmented. These changes will take time during which the PK force may be placed in a precarious position of having neither the authority nor the capability to accomplish its tasks. It is essential that the political and military decision makers clearly understand the local situation before issuing a mandate. PK forces should not be deployed when consensus is lacking.




Figure 4-1. Framework of Peace Operations

4-39. In the event of a collapsed or failing state, peace building is essential to strengthen and rebuild government infrastructures and institutions. Peace building creates a self-sustaining peace and avoids a relapse into conflict. Peace operations are designed to establish a stable environment in which peace building can occur. Without the active support and participation of the parties in conflict as well as the host nation as a whole, no peace operation will succeed.

FUNDAMENTALS OF PEACE OPERATIONS

4-40. The foundations of stability operations and support operations discussed in Chapter 1 apply to peace operations. The following fundamentals also apply specifically to peace operations. Commanders and participants

should understand these concepts as they conduct peace operations: consent, impartiality, transparency, restraint, credibility, freedom of movement, flexibility, civil-military operations, legitimacy, and perseverance.

CONSENT

4-41. In war, consent is not an issue for the military commander. In peace operations, however, the level of consent determines fundamentals of the operation. One side may consent in whole or in part, multiple parties may consent, there may be no consent, or the consent may vary dramatically over time. There may be consent at the strategic level among the party representatives signing an agreement. However, renegade local groups at the tactical level may disagree with their leaders and remain hostile to a peace operation. By its nature, a PE force must be employed in operations even when there is no general consent or when there is uncertainty regarding consent. Figure 4-1 shows the relationship between the amount or level of consent and force capability requirements. When strong consent or commitment by the parties to the peace agreement exists, then reduced force capability is required. Peacekeeping operations are appropriate under these conditions. But as the level of consent decreases, the level of force capability to enforce compliance must increase, creating conditions for peace enforcement operations.

4-42. The promotion of consent is fundamental to achieving the political end state in all peace operations. Closely linked to consent is the compliance with the agreement or mandate. The enforcement of compliance may be a necessary condition to maintain consent.

4-43. Peace without justice may undermine consent and eventually the entire peace operation. Civil strife may have destroyed or compromised the police and judicial system beyond repair, forcing the PE force to assume those functions until a civil system is in place, often under the supervision of international civilian police. The commander must participate in the interagency process to determine the tasks and responsibilities in relation to the *rule of law* aspects of the operation. It will not be the military commander's responsibility to establish the institutions. Still, he must insist on an interagency assessment on rule of law issues so that an interagency plan can be developed and the military's role defined.

4-44. Commanders should seek ways to promote consent by giving the people, parties, and local institutions a stake in the peace process. Information regarding consent should be disseminated throughout the various parties' leadership at all levels. When a decision is reached with one leader, all must be aware of this decision as soon as possible. Joint Military Commissions, liaison officers, media broadcasts, and leaders throughout the force are key means to promote consent and transmit agreements concerning consent.

4-45. Consent can be lost if one side perceives the peace operations force to favor the other side. Loss of consent in a peacekeeping operation may lead to an escalation of violence and profoundly change the nature of the operation. Any decline of consent is therefore of concern to the peace operation commander and may unfavorably influence how the campaign develops. A lightly armed force specifically organized and equipped for peacekeeping will be incapable of containing the escalating situation caused by the loss of consent.

If the political body that authorized the operation desires to enforce a peace, then it must change the mandate and deploy a force capable of offensive and defensive operations. This will be a significant operational adjustment unless the force was deployed under a Chapter VII (of the UN Charter) mandate (peace enforcement) and was configured for combat.

4-46. If consent develops and all sides demonstrate their commitment to the peace process through acts and deeds, then a force organized and deployed as a PE force can gradually introduce those techniques appropriate to peacekeeping. For example, the NATO led Implementation Force (IFOR) entered Bosnia as a PE force under a Chapter VII mandate. Under Stabilization Force (SFOR), the force is gradually using peacekeeping techniques in areas where compliance and consent exist. However, the mandate remains unchanged and SFOR retains its combat power and authority.

IMPARTIALITY

4-47. Impartiality is a fundamental of peace operations that distinguishes PO from offensive and defensive combat operations. Impartiality requires the PO force to act on behalf of the peace process and mandate, showing no preference for any faction or group over another. Corrective actions are taken for noncompliance rather than a desire to support or oppose a particular party. Figure 4-1 illustrates that in war impartiality is not an issue, and that ultimately the terms of any peace plan could be imposed on the belligerents (enemy) without consultation or agreement.

4-48. The degree to which the force acts in an impartial manner and the degree to which the belligerent parties perceive the force to be impartial influence a peace operation. Even-handed treatment of all sides in the conflict can improve the prospects for lasting peace and security, even when combat operations are underway. Compromised impartiality may trigger an uncontrollable escalation from a PK operation to a PE operation, or from a PE operation to a conflict situation, by adversely affecting consent and jeopardizing the success of any peace operation.

4-49. Forces, whether peacekeeping or peace enforcement, must always strive to be impartial and use information operations to support this perception among the populace and various parties. Impartiality should not be confused with neutrality. An analogy can help to relate impartiality to the conduct of operations: the impartial status of a legal system is not compromised because it only punishes the guilty, though that may not be the perception of a career criminal. Therefore, using force, even when applied in an even-handed manner, is unlikely to be perceived as such, especially by any party that persistently transgresses. Thus, the power of information must be brought to bear, and the fundamental of transparency becomes all-important.

TRANSPARENCY

4-50. Transparency means that the peace operation force must communicate its intentions and capabilities to all audiences inside and outside the area of operations. This differs from offensive and defensive operations when the force conceals its intentions and capabilities. PE forces must make the parties and the populace aware of the operational mandate, mission, intentions,

and techniques used to ensure compliance. Transparency serves to reinforce legitimacy and impartiality. It is more difficult to challenge the impartial status of an operation if the parties are kept informed. A failure to communicate will foster suspicion and may erode the development of the trust and confidence on which the long-term success of the operations depends. Integrated and synchronized information operations are necessary to facilitate transparency. Civil-military programs, joint commissions, and an effective liaison system reinforce transparency. The need for transparency must be balanced against the need for operations security. Some instances may exist, especially in a peace enforcement operation, that security may initially preclude the complete sharing of information. However, protocols are established to share as much information as possible.

RESTRAINT

4-51. In PO, restraint is an exercise in the prudent and appropriate application of military capability. Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence characterize the environment of peace operations. While PK is usually nonviolent, PE may include violent offensive and defensive operations. The use of excessive force may adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short- and long-term goals. On the other hand, appropriately using force to prevent factional groups from destroying the peace process can strengthen consent. These restraints should be clearly spelled out in the ROE provided for the operation by higher authority. Commanders strive for full situational understanding to determine how best to use this force.

4-52. In PK, force is used only in self-defense. In PE, force may be used to coerce (see Figure 4-1). It may have far-reaching international political consequences. Use of force may attract a response in kind. It may also escalate tension and violence in the local area and embroil peace operations troops in a harmful, long-term conflict contrary to their aims. For that reason, use of force should be a last resort and, whenever possible, should be used when other means of persuasion are exhausted. Use of force is a critical planning concern. To be a credible deterrent, PO units must deploy with sufficient combat capability tailored to circumstances of that particular peace operation.

4-53. Commanders should always seek to de-escalate and not inflame an incident or crisis. Alternatives to force should be fully explored before armed action is taken. They include negotiation (see Appendix E), which may be used to reconcile opponents, both to one another and to the peace operations force.

4-54. Restraint does not preclude the application of sufficient or overwhelming force when required to establish dominance, to display US resolve and commitment, to protect US or indigenous lives and property, or to accomplish other critical objectives. The fundamental of restraint will permeate considerations concerning ROE, the choice of weapons and equipment, and control measures such as weapon control status. When force is used, it should be precise and overwhelming to minimize friendly and noncombatant casualties and collateral damage.

CREDIBILITY

4-55. A credible force is essential to ensure mission accomplishment. Credibility reflects the warring faction's assessment of the capability of the PO force to accomplish its mission. The force must have the proper structure and resources with appropriate ROE to accomplish the mandate. It discharges its duties swiftly and firmly, leaving no doubt as to its capabilities and commitment. All personnel consistently demonstrate the highest standards of discipline, control, and professional behavior on and off duty.

4-56. Nations contributing to the peace operation force should demonstrate their political will to see the mission through to its end. If nations withdraw their support or fail to provide assets in a timely manner, credibility will be weakened. Information operations promote credibility not just in the area of operations but also in the international community.

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

4-57. Freedom of movement equates to maintaining the initiative. As amplified in the mandate, no restrictions are allowed against the movement of the peace force or of the civilian population. Attempts by the parties to impose increased restrictions reflect lessened consent. Freedom of movement is a necessary condition for the peace process to move forward. If the parties persist in denying freedom of movement, the authorizing political organization must assess the situation to determine if the mandate must change or the force must withdraw.

FLEXIBILITY

4-58. The complex multinational and interagency environment in which US forces conduct peace operations require commanders at all levels to place a premium on initiative and flexibility. Commanders and staffs must continually analyze their mission in the changing political context, and change tasks, missions, and operations as appropriate. The successful transition to peace involves managing change. Forces should be able to adapt and move from one activity to another on short notice. Tailoring the force enhances flexibility by providing for a force properly balanced for the mission in terms of skills, capabilities, equipment, and logistics.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

4-59. Military and civilian organizations have always interacted with each other. As a central feature of peace operations, CMO help harmonize civilian and military activities to maximize the use of resources designed to redress the deprivation and suffering of the people. CMO enhance the credibility of the friendly force. They promote consent and legitimacy and encourage the parties of the conflict to work toward a peaceful settlement.

4-60. Humanitarian assistance will be a part of many peace operations. Humanitarian assistance can significantly impact resources required and other aspects of these operations. In peace operations, humanitarian assistance encourages stability that reduces the civilian dependency on external military assistance.

4-61. Early in the peace operation, critical and immediate tasks normally carried out by civilian organizations may have to be performed by the military or with substantial military cooperation when the situation has temporarily exceeded their capabilities. In these situations, the PO force provides immediate relief and helps to create a sustainable infrastructure. Forces may also be required to prevent hostile, uncooperative, or criminally-oriented groups from gaining control of services, facilities, administrative posts or sectors of the economy. The same force will require civil affairs assistance when dealing with a large number of refugees; displaced persons; UN and non-governmental organizations; and local, regional, and national civil authorities.

4-62. CMO in peace operations should focus on empowering civilian agencies and organizations to assume full authority for implementing the civil portion of the peace effort. As the operation progresses, civilian organizations should assume greater responsibilities for civil functions and require less assistance from the military force. The relationships established in the initial stages coupled with accurate assessments of progress achieved in civil-military implementation are crucial to smoothly transitioning responsibility and ultimately extracting the force. Plans for transition and termination should be completed before deployment or as soon as possible during the initial phase.

4-63. PO seek to restore peace by promoting national reconciliation and often establishing or reestablishing effective government. The military often achieves its military objectives quickly, but the completion of the mission and its departure force invariably depend on progress in the civil arena.

4-64. Leaders use military assets sparingly when civilian assets are more appropriate in promoting the overall objectives of the mission. For example, Army assets may be able to repair a road quickly and efficiently, but providing work to unemployed civilians may be a better solution. Such a decision promotes support for the political settlement that the mission is seeking to implement.

4-65. Often coherence and accountability are best achieved by working through the appropriate lead international organization. A lead agency is one that the international community has mandated to initiate coordinating the activities of the civilian organizations that volunteer to participate in a mission. It is normally a major relief agency. Specific responsibilities of a lead agency are—

- Acting as a point of contact for other agencies, particularly in the areas of planning and information sharing.
- Coordinating field activities to avoid duplicating effort and wasting resources.
- Interfacing with the military.

4-66. The best way to understand the skills, knowledge, and capabilities of international organizations, NGOs, and US government agencies is to maintain relationships with them before entering a mission. Including civilian agency personnel in selected field training exercises effectively aids to develop working relationships based on trust and understanding. Commanders should press for such team-building exercises with all entities before deploying on a mission.

4-67. Many partners from the international community, such as international organizations and NGOs, contribute to achieving the purpose of a peace operation. However, the roles of indigenous leaders and organizations should not be overlooked. Appropriately involving local institutions and agencies with the international effort is a challenging but essential task.

LEGITIMACY

4-68. Legitimacy is required to sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern, or a group or agency to make and carry out decisions. It is a condition growing from the perception of a specific audience of the legality, morality, and correctness of a set of actions. It is initially derived from the mandate authorizing and directing the conduct of operations. However, the perception of legitimacy can only be sustained with the US public, US forces, indigenous parties, and the international community if operations are conducted with scrupulous regard for international norms on the use of military forces and regard for the humanitarian principles. Commanders must be aware of the authority under which they operate and the relationship between it and the other sources of legitimacy that are present. During operations where a clearly legitimate government does not exist, using extreme caution in dealing with individuals and organizations will avoid inadvertently legitimizing them. Conducting information operations, to include the related activity of public affairs, can enhance both domestic and international perceptions of the legitimacy of an operation. Legitimacy also reinforces the morale of the PO force.

PERSEVERANCE

4-69. PO forces must be prepared for the measured, sustained application of military capability in support of strategic aims. While some peace operations may be of short duration, most require long-term commitment that involves more than military efforts alone. Underlying causes of confrontation and conflict rarely have a clear beginning or a decisive resolution. Commanders need to assess actions against their contribution to long-term strategic objectives.

4-70. Perseverance requires an information strategy that clearly explains the goals, objectives, and desired end states and links them with US interests and concerns. The long-term nature of many peace operations must be continually emphasized without giving the impression of permanency.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

4-71. Commanders in peace operations must marshal all their experience, knowledge, skill, and wisdom to succeed. They must often operate outside the hierarchical structures to which they are accustomed. Command and control (C2) in peace operations often entails complex arrangements and relationships. Mutual trust is a necessity.

It's all about trust—up, down, and all around.

Major General C. F. Ernst

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

4-72. US military forces will normally operate as part of a multinational peace force and apply the principles and considerations found in JP 3-16 and FM 3-16. The preferred command relationship in PEO is lead nation or lead alliance. This provides the peace force commander with the maximum control of forces where the risk may be high.

4-73. Three levels of authority govern UN peace operations. Overall political direction and authority belong to the Security Council. Executive direction and control rest with the Secretary-General. Field authority rests with the UN Chief of Mission. Thus, the line of authority for UN operations runs from the Security Council to the Secretary-General to the UN Chief of Mission. Appendix A contains definitions of command relationships and more details on UN organization.

4-74. For military observers assigned to UN peacekeeping duties, the direct line of command goes to the office of the US Military Observer Group—Washington (under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations on the Army Staff). If small contingents are assigned to UN duty, their chain of command will likely run through a combatant commander.

4-75. Leaders at all levels should understand the key documents related to the PO mission. These documents include—

- ROE.
- Peace agreement.
- International organization mandate (NATO, UN).
- Terms of reference and military-to-military agreements.
- Status-of-forces agreements.
- Status of mission agreements.
- Memorandums of understanding (MOUs).

4-76. Parties involved in the conflict will challenge leaders at every level. Peace agreements that were signed by political leaders may not have the support or consent of all the people of the region. Consequently, situations arise where individuals challenge the very existence of the agreed upon documents. Leaders at every echelon must be familiar with these documents to perform their mission.

4-77. The role of the senior US commander in PO is more extensive than what would be expected. It will encompass the full spectrum of threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment. The commander and his force must be prepared to adapt to this complex and fluid environment.

COORDINATION

4-78. Coordinated Pol-Mil plans are essential for success in all peace operations and provide the civil-military interface that synchronizes the efforts of the various agencies assisting the peace process. Whether objectives are humanitarian, political, or military, synchronization of effort is essential. Combatant commanders usually include the Pol-Mil plan in their plans. The Pol-Mil plan is drawn from the national-level Pol-Mil plan and takes into

account the goals and objectives of the various agencies assisting the peace plan. (National-level interagency coordination is described in Appendix A.) Perseverance aids in synchronizing the efforts of all involved. Competing agendas create situations where synchronization can break down. The military must keep focused but remain adaptable and work toward the end state. Annex A to Appendix B in JP 3-57 contains a sample Political-Military Plan.

4-79. The CMOC, or equivalent function, helps facilitate coordination between the civilian and military elements. Lessons learned from PO have shown that comprehensive civil-military coordination in peace operations can—

- Harmonize military and civilian implementation and planning.
- Ensure the unity of effort.
- Streamline transfer of authority.
- Enhance relations with international organizations and NGOs.
- Eliminate duplication of effort.
- Eliminate confusion.

INTELLIGENCE

4-80. Intelligence collection and production is challenging in peace operations. The situation in the area of operations often reflects a convoluted historical process. The area may be remote. The intelligence community may not have thoroughly studied it before deployment. Although the methodology for collecting intelligence is generally the same as it is in other military operations, the focus and the sources are often quite different. In PO, the intelligence operation must help to collect—then fuse—political, criminal, economic, linguistic, demographic, ethnic, psychological, and other information regarding conditions and forces that influence the society. The sources of information will be nontraditional and include open sources. These sources can be travel agencies and commercial ventures as well as international organizations and NGOs that have most likely been engaged in the area before the arrival of Army forces.

PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT

4-81. The principles of intelligence and electronic warfare operations outlined in FM 2-91.1 apply in PO. Several principles contribute to the success of intelligence support to peace operations:

- **Human intelligence.** Human intelligence (HUMINT) is the dominant discipline in peace operations. It has broad focus, collecting against all participants, to support not only the military operation but also the political processes in which the military is involved. The collection may be conducted by a multinational HUMINT organization as well as national assets thus presenting challenges to integration and synchronization. This is especially important when it comes to counterintelligence and force protection. To be successful, HUMINT operations must commence as soon as possible, ideally before the arrival of the main force.
- **Intelligence synchronization.** Although important in any military operation, synchronization takes on a broader dimension in a peace

operation. Due to the multinational and civil dimensions of peace operations, the intelligence system must consider multinational participants, many of who do not have information sharing agreements with the US. The intelligence system must give special attention to integrating NGOs, information operations (IO), and host nations into the process.

- ***Tactical tailoring.*** Intelligence architecture must be task organized. Traditional architecture does not normally broadcast national-level intelligence to the tactical level. However, that is the type of information that the tactical commander needs during PO. Military intelligence units and organizations must adapt their traditional wartime structure to meet the specific demands of a peace operation. PO often require liaison with and support to organizations that normally would not get liaison. Local civil, military, and police authorities; NGOs; international organizations; and UN organizations must be included in the information loop. Tailoring the intelligence structure to accommodate these critical links to information often requires economy of force elsewhere.
- ***Broadcast dissemination.*** Broadcast dissemination in peace operations facilitates the “push” of information to commanders in the field. Commanders must ensure that broadcast dissemination encompasses the various coalition command, control, communication, and intelligence architecture, while maintaining information security and information assurance guidelines. This becomes especially challenging when working with coalition partners with whom the US does not have information sharing agreements. The media must also be considered a tool for dissemination as well as collection. Commanders must be willing to adapt the system to function in coalition architectures as well as civil structures in accordance with releasability guidance.

INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS

Indications and Warning

4-82. The commander monitors potential situations that affect the mandate of the forces. Change can come from a friendly government, a belligerent, a neutral, or from the political leadership. The commander should stay abreast of breaking news events. Because these events can have significant political and strategic impacts, the intelligence staff works closely with the information operations cell and the planning staff.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

4-83. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is a continuous process that includes gathering information on areas in which a unit might be required to operate (see FM 2-01.3). It begins before deployment notification and may be based on open-source intelligence. When notification comes, having current information will reduce uncertainties regarding the adversary, the environment—including the medical threat and terrain in a given area—and facilitate mission planning. Successful intelligence support during PO relies on continuous information collection and intelligence production.

4-84. Ground reconnaissance and meetings with key interagency, international organization, and NGO players are essential to IPB. The information gathering should focus on areas that influence people, such as cultures, politics, religion, economics, and related factors and any variances in affected groups of people.

4-85. IPB must be developed in sufficient detail to support information operations. Based on the breadth of information collected, pattern analysis, which includes links and nodes, will be useful to the information operations cell for nonlethal—and, if necessary, lethal—targeting.

Situational Development

4-86. PO present challenges to maintaining a common operational picture. The long-term nature of PO means that the situational development effort will be long term. Analysts must consider “soft” political issues, civilian attitudes, refugee movements, and the agendas of the friendly partners in the PO. Predictive intelligence ensures that operations continue and initiative is sustained. Anticipation is the watchword. It will be a key challenge because the analysts must deal with the attitudes and behaviors of the people.

Targeting and Target Development

4-87. The focus in peace operations is to integrate all aspects of military power with nonmilitary instruments to achieve success. Such activities as civic action, infrastructure support, and public relations events should be considered part of the targeting process. The concept of target and weapon system must be expanded. Most targets will be engaged with nonlethal means. The concept of target and weapon system must be expanded. High-value and high-payoff target lists must focus on changing the behaviors of target audiences. The effects on the target itself are not as important as the effects on the target audience.

4-88. Targets can include civil and military leaders who control or influence the local population or the assets that these leaders use to achieve their ends. For example, if the leaders are trying to turn a legal political rally into a riot, then the radio broadcasts, loudspeaker vans, or even the busses to transport troublemakers to the rally become targets.

4-89. Assessment in peace operations is a challenge. The difficult issue in peace operations is that the “target” is soft and does not fit neatly into the criterion of damage assessment. Many times the results are psychological and do not manifest themselves until weeks or months after the events. HUMINT along with patience are critical.

Support for Force Protection

4-90. Early coordination for intelligence support to protect the force should be conducted with allies, partners, and the host nation. The intelligence support must balance with the requirements for transparency and impartiality. Additionally, the issue of intelligence sharing must be solved.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

4-91. Offensive IO, including the use of the related activities of public affairs and CMO, strengthen both consent and the legitimacy of the operation through the fundamental of transparency. The impartiality of the force must be maintained and conditions created to strengthen consent where it exists and to create it where it does not. In peace operations, offensive IO influence the behavior of people to work toward reconciliation and rebuilding. Information is the peace operations commander's primary means to influence groups of people to change attitudes and behavior. IO can affect the center of gravity directly. All sides understand the potential of information and will attempt its exploitation.

NATURE OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS

4-92. In PO, the military commander cannot exercise the degree of control over the information environment that he can in war. The fundamentals of transparency and legitimacy demand that he engage openly within this complex environment.

4-93. The PO force will be a latecomer to a situation that has a long, complex, and convoluted history. The various factions will have been using information as a weapon through censorship, propaganda, and disinformation. The local, as well as the international, media will usually be operating before the forces arrive and may be one of the causative factors in the military's engagement.

4-94. Additionally, allies and partner countries participating in multinational force may have troops engaged before US military involvement. The operational area will not be a blank tablet. Information superiority will be transitory in this environment, making absolute and sustained superiority impossible.

4-95. The commander must carefully consider the effects of IO before taking action. Destroying a belligerent's electronic warfare capability may bring favorable tactical results, but it may also have a destabilizing effect on the peace process. Permitting belligerents to not only monitor activities of each other, but also of the PO force may provide the transparency that eases tension and increases trust.

4-96. The information environment will extend down to the man on the street and the soldier at the checkpoint. Individuals, by interacting directly with the media or on-line, can become a powerful source of information that can challenge the more traditional sources. Local events and the immediate impressions of individuals about those events can have international significance as the global media broadcasts them.

FUNDAMENTALS OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN PEACE OPERATIONS

4-97. ***The commander sets the tone.*** Although supported by a staff and IO coordinators and sections, the commander sets the tone and drives the operation on the basis of senior political guidance and approved public information themes. For IO to succeed, commanders must be involved. They must make this their personal focus so that the entire force can speak with one voice. Only commanders can provide the vision and the guidance that will unify the effort. In PO, commanders will often be the media's focus and chief

negotiators in sensitive situations. Some actions they can take to unify the effort include—

- Establishing commander's critical information requirements that are oriented around IO.
- Developing a media policy.
- Providing daily IO guidance.
- Implementing a decision cycle that supports IO. It must allow commanders to obtain situational understanding, perform the military decision making process, and issue appropriate guidance before meeting the media or entering negotiations.

4-98. The IO cell incorporates the relevant multinational participants. It ensures that IO fully integrate into the joint and multinational targeting process. Integration and synchronization should extend down to the individual soldier.

4-99. ***Support IO with intelligence.*** Without detailed intelligence that encompasses the complete spectrum of cultural, social, political, economic, and psychological issues focused on an individual, IO cannot be properly targeted. The IO planner will require such products as nodal and link analysis based on accurate and up-to-date intelligence.

4-100. ***Establish and sustain an integrated team approach.*** Successful IO require synchronizing all participants involved in the peace process. The combined effort must include nonmilitary agencies. Specifically, the public affairs office and the PSYOP staff must be integrated and have access to current and proposed military actions.

4-101. ***Anticipate and respond with speed, accuracy, and truth.*** Journalists provide immediate impressions and judgments while the military relies on verified information. For the military, accuracy overrides immediacy. However, perceptions can be formed and decisions can be made based on these initial impressions. Timing is essential in shaping perceptions. The public affairs officer must know operations as they unfold and be allowed to release information as quickly as possible.

4-102. ***Involve every soldier.*** The soldier is the Army's best ambassador. The most powerful way to influence populations is for every member of the force to be an information transmitter. Ensure that all members of the force understand the information operations plan and can articulate its themes to others.

4-103. ***Maintain transparency.*** Transparency supports legitimacy and assists in maintaining consent. Admiral Layton Smith, Commander IFOR, had this objective, "If we [IFOR] know, they [the media] know." Under these circumstances, disseminate information, including bad news and mistakes, as quickly as possible to gain and maintain credibility with the international media and the host nation.

4-104. ***Gain and maintain access to the information environment.*** The military force must actively participate in the information environment. The outside media will be present outside the military headquarters and

interested parties will be visiting the force's web site. The commander should consider developing an accessible web site.

4-105. ***Prepare for IO before deployment.*** The belligerent parties will have been waging an information campaign long before involving the Army. Army forces should not wait until they receive deployment orders to begin to address the informational aspects of the operation and hope to gain the initiative. Commanders should consider predeployment preparation, anticipating future involvement in PO.

CIVIL LAW AND ORDER

4-106. The rule of law is fundamental to peace and stability. A safe and secure environment maintained by a civilian law enforcement system must exist and operate in accordance with internationally recognized standards and with respect for internationally recognized human rights and freedoms. Civilian organizations are responsible for civil law and order. However, Army forces may need to provide limited support.

POLICE

4-107. To secure public order, the host nation or responsible international authority requests introducing civilian police and establishing a police training element such as the International Police Training Force in Bosnia. The International Crime Investigative Training Assistance Program from the Department of Justice may be used. International civilian police do not ordinarily exercise executive authority, but rather monitor and mentor local police. When the indigenous security and police forces are nonexistent or incapable and international police training programs cannot generate sufficient resources quickly enough, the military may be required to assist. The military commander should consider requesting civil law enforcement units from member nations of the multinational force to take the lead in these missions. This allows the military police to continue other high priority missions. This gives the commander an advantage in dealing with the legal and practical issue of what is essentially a civil police issue.

Civilian Administration

During Operation JOINT GUARD in Kosovo, until a complete code of law was established, KFOR forces, in conjunction with the UN, served as the civil police force until UN Mission in Kosovo Police (UNMIK-P) was established in sufficient numbers. Each multinational force maintained its own detention facility for local detainees. Local magistrates, lawyers, and peacekeeping forces oversaw the judicial system. These facilities were also open to the inspection of international organizations such as the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe and International Red Cross. The US forces assigned only military police to these duties.

JUDICIARY

4-108. Army forces may assist in establishing a workable judicial system with judge advocate general (JAG) and CA support. The law standards to be

used and their effect on SOFAs and MOUs will be important considerations. The commander's legal and political advisors should be engaged in developing the system to ensure that military concerns are addressed.

PENAL

4-109. Army forces may be required to establish and run temporary confinement facilities until civilian agencies take the lead. The engineer and military police community should be prepared to deal with temporarily confining civilian prisoners accused of civil crimes. Consideration should be given to deploying the soldiers holding appropriate military occupational specialty for confinement duties. The international community should establish standards and rules of confinement during the planning phase to allow proper preparation.

WAR CRIMES AND CRIMINALS

4-110. War crimes and corruption can jeopardize the accomplishment of the PO force's objectives and prevent its timely withdrawal. As previously discussed, peace without justice undermines consent and can affect the entire peace process. Although controlling corruption and organized crime is primarily the responsibility of the host nation and the civilian police, the military has capabilities—such as intelligence, communications, and the ability to provide a security presence—that can help.

4-111. The term *war crime* is sometimes used to describe a violation of the law of war. In peace operations, US forces apply the principles and spirit of the law of war to the extent practicable and feasible, even when a state of war does not exist. US forces will comply with the law of war while conducting all military operations and related activities in armed conflict.

4-112. The UN Security Council may decide to establish a commission or other body to investigate alleged war crimes. If the allegations appear to be true, the Security Council may establish or help create a tribunal to prosecute the offenders. If the host nation is unwilling or incapable of bringing the alleged war criminal to justice, then the civilian police and Army forces may be called on to assist in detecting, apprehending, and transporting these individuals to the tribunal. Planning for these operations is detailed and should include JAG and public affairs officer participation. An additional consideration is that all nations in a multinational force may not agree to a role concerning war crimes and war criminals.

LOGISTICS

4-113. Logistics is as challenging in PO as it is in war. The logistics and combat service support planning considerations presented in Chapter 2 apply to peace operations. FM 3-16 and JP 3-16 are also excellent references for logistic considerations in stability operations and support operations. The following paragraphs contain additional considerations for PO.

4-114. The US military has the following capabilities that are frequently requested in support of PO:

- Rapid C2 and logistics planning capability.

- Strategic and tactical airlift.
- Emergency infrastructure repair and support (port, airfield, road).

4-115. Army forces will usually conduct PO as part of a joint, multinational, and interagency effort. Logistics must operate with multinational forces and civilian organizations. Additionally, the military force may also provide support to the host nation. Army forces should establish a CMOC to coordinate support with nonmilitary agencies. The location of this entity will greatly influence its effectiveness (see paragraph A-79).

4-116. Early in the planning process, the commander of the peace operations force must receive guidance on the authority to direct logistics. The Army commander involved in the peace operation must know what authority will be delegated to him. If the force is multinational, the scope of that authority must be appropriate to meet the needs of a multinational effort.

4-117. The Army is responsible for the logistic support of its own forces, except when logistic support is otherwise provided for by agreement with national agencies, multinational partners, or by assignments to common, joint, or cross-servicing agreements. The authority for logistics must be considered in the context of STANAG (Standard NATO Agreements), Foreign Military Sales, agreements under the NATO Mutual Support Act, and other bilateral and multinational agreements.

FORCE PROTECTION

4-118. Force protection measures directly relate to mission accomplishment. They should enhance consensus and assist in creating the conditions for other political, economic, and humanitarian peace building activities to achieve the political objectives.

4-119. In PO, force protection measures should be consistent with the risk assessment, but they should not be excessive. A level of force protection that exceeds the risk assessment sends a psychological signal to the population that they are still in a tense and uncertain environment. It may retard the return to normalcy and the establishment of conditions that will prevent the peace process from continuing. Additionally, it can limit the contact between the force and local population, reducing the force's capability to gather HUMINT and the ability of the force to mitigate tense situations through negotiations.

4-120. Civilian organizations, the media, and others may request the military force to provide security. Although this security is not technically "force protection," it may serve to enhance credibility with these groups and potentially provide the commander with an opportunity to advance cooperation.

4-121. Maintaining neutrality and transparency in operations enhances force protection. However, personal awareness is the most proactive measure. This awareness is based on an education, training, and preparation program that acquaints the soldier with the culture and the environment.